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Abstract
We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. persuasion) with a single
sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently
drawn from action-specific marginal distributions. As in the standard Bayesian
persuasion model, the sender has access to additional information regarding the
action types, which she can exploit when committing to a (noisy) signaling scheme
through which she sends a private signal to each receiver. The novelty of our
model is in considering the case where the receivers interact in a sequential game
with imperfect information, with utilities depending on the game outcome and
the realized action types. After formalizing the notions of ex ante and ex interim
persuasiveness (which differ in the time at which the receivers commit to following
the sender’s signaling scheme), we investigate the continuous optimization problem
of computing a signaling scheme which maximizes the sender’s expected revenue.
We show that computing an optimal ex ante persuasive signaling scheme is NP-
hard when there are three or more receivers. In contrast with previous hardness
results for ex interim persuasion, we show that, for games with two receivers, an
optimal ex ante persuasive signaling scheme can be computed in polynomial time
thanks to a novel algorithm based on the ellipsoid method which we propose.
1 Introduction
Bayesian persuasion revolves around influencing the behavior of self-interested agents through the
provision of payoff-relevant information [20]. Differently from traditional mechanism design, where
the designer influences the outcome by providing tangible incentives, in Bayesian persuasion the
designer influences the outcome by deciding who gets to know what [8]. Real-world applications are
ubiquitous. For instance, this framework has been recently applied to security problems [28, 35, 36],
financial-sector stress testing [16], voter coalition formation [1], and online advertisement [4, 14].
The classical Bayesian persuasion model involves a single sender and a single receiver where the
sender, who has access to some private information, designs a signaling scheme in order to persuade
the receiver to select a favorable action. The model assumes the sender’s commitment power. This
hypothesis is realistic in many settings where reputation and credibility are a key factor for the
long-term utility of the sender [29], as well as whenever an automated signaling scheme either has to
abide by a contractual service agreement or it is enforced by a trusted authority [10].
The extension to the case with multiple receivers is of major interest (see, e.g., its applications to
private-value auctions [22]). In this setting, most of the works assume a public signal model in which
all the receivers observe the same information [13, 1, 11]. A more general setting is the private signal
one, in which the sender may tailor receiver-specific signals. Persuasion with private signals has
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been explored only in very specific settings, such as two-agents two-action games [31], unanimity
elections [5], binary auctions with no inter-agent externalities [2, 3], and voting with binary action
spaces and binary states of Nature [34]. As pointed out by Dughmi [10], the problem of computing
private signaling schemes in multi-receivers settings still lacks a general algorithmic framework.
Differently from classical Bayesian persuasion models, which typically assume that the receivers
take their actions simultaneously [10, 21], we address, for the first time in the literature (to the best
of our knowledge), the multi-receiver case with sequential interactions among receivers. As most
of the real-world economic interactions take place sequentially, this allows for a greater modeling
flexibility which could be exploited in the context of, e.g, sequential auctions [25]. In the paper, we
show how to address sequential, multi-receiver settings algorithmically via the notion of ex ante
persuasive signaling scheme, where receivers commit to following the sender’s recommendations
by only observing the signaling scheme. This is motivated by the fact that the classical notion of
persuasiveness (ex interim persuasiveness) which allows the receivers to deviate after observing the
sender’s signal renders most of the associated design problems (with the exception of very narrow
settings) computationally intractable [12], ultimately making its adoption impractical in real-world
applications where the receivers act sequentially.
Ex ante persuasive signaling schemes may be employed every time the environment allows for a
credible receivers’ commitment before the recommendations are revealed. As argued by Kamenica
and Gentzkow [20], this is not unrealistic. On a general level, the receivers will uphold their ex
ante commitment every time they reason with a long-term horizon where a reputation for credibility
positively affects their utility [29]. In some cases, they could also be forced to stick to their ex ante
commitment by contractual agreements. Many real-world problems involve ex ante commitments.
This is the case, for example, of sequential auction in online advertising, where a (trusted) third party
service (e.g., programmatic advertising platforms) could allow bidders for coordinated behaviors
during the sequential auction, leading to better outcomes in terms of bidders’ payoffs, and to more
efficient allocations of the ads.
Original contributions. We investigate persuasion games with multiple receivers interacting in a
sequential game, and study the continuous optimization problem of computing a private signaling
scheme which maximizes the sender’s expected utility. We focus on the framework with independent
action types, similarly to what is done by Dughmi and Xu [12]. We introduce the notion of ex
ante persuasive signaling scheme, and formalize its differences from ex interim persuasive schemes.
Motivated by the hardness results for the ex interim setting with simultaneous moves provided
by Dughmi and Xu [12], we study the problem of computing optimal ex ante signaling schemes. We
show that one such scheme may be computed in polynomial time in settings with two receivers and
independent action types, which makes ex ante persuasive signaling schemes a plausible persuasion
tool in practice. In proving this result, we show that, given any behavioral strategy of a perfect-recall
player, it is possible to find, in polynomial time, a realization-equivalent mixed strategy with a
polynomially-sized support. when there are three or more receivers. Moreover, we show that the
case with two receivers is the largest one, in terms of players, in which the problem of computing
an optimal ex ante signaling scheme is tractable by showing that with three or more receivers the
problem is NP-hard.
2 Bayesian Persuasion with Sequential Games
We assume, in our model, a sender denoted by S and a set of receivers R = {1, . . . , n}. Each
receiver i ∈ R is faced with the problem of selecting actions from a set Ai with a priori uncertain
payoffs. We adopt the perspective of the sender, whose goal is persuading the receivers to take
actions which are favorable for her. The fundamental feature of our model is that receivers confront
themselves in a sequential decision problem, which we describe as an extensive-form game (EFG)
with imperfect information and perfect recall.
Payoffs are a function of the actions taken by the receivers and of an unknown state of nature θ,
drawn from a set of potential realizations Θ. We follow the standard framework of Dughmi and Xu
[12] where each action a has a set of possible types Θa and in which a state of nature θ is a vector
specifying the realized type of each action of the receivers, i.e., θ ∈ Θ =×i∈R×a∈Ai Θa.1 We
assume action types which are drawn independently from action-specific marginal distributions. We
1Standard (i.e., non Bayesian) EFGs can be represented by assigning to each Θa a singleton. Note that this
model also encompasses Bayesian games á la Harsanyi [18].
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denote them by p˜ia ∈ int(∆|Θa|), where p˜ia(t) is the probability of a having type t ∈ Θa.2 These
marginal distributions form a common prior over the states of nature which we assume to be known
explicitly to both sender and receivers. This common knowledge can be equivalently represented by
the distribution µ0 ∈ ∆|Θ|, where µ0(θ) =
∏
i∈R
∏
a∈Ai p˜ia(θa).
We now provide some background on EFGs, and describe our two models of optimal signaling.
2.1 Background on EFGs
An EFG—here denoted by Γ—is composed of a set H of nodes, each of which identified by the
ordered sequence of actions leading to it from the root node. The set of terminal nodes of the game
is denoted by Z ⊆ H . The game is played by the receivers R. Ai is the set of actions available
to each receiver i ∈ R. Let A = {Ai}i∈R. For each nonterminal node h ∈ H \ Z, we denote by,
respectively, P (h) and A(h) the unique receiver acting at h and the set of actions available at that
node. Imperfect information is represented via information sets (or infosets), which group together
decision nodes which are indistinguishable for a certain receiver. For each receiver i, we denote
her set of infosets by Ii. Ii defines a partition of {h ∈ H | P (h) = i}. Each I ∈ Ii is such that
A(h) = A(h′) ∀h, h′ ∈ I . To simplify the notation, let A(I) be the set of actions available at each
decision node in I . Receiver i has perfect recall if she has perfect memory of her past actions and
observations.
We denote a behavioral strategy of receiver i by pii. It corresponds to a vector defining a probability
distribution over A(I), ∀I ∈ Ii. Given pii, let pii,I be the (sub)vector representing the probability
distribution at I ∈ Ii. Letting, for each receiver i, Σi =×I∈Ii A(I), a plan is a vector σi ∈ Σi
which specifies an action for each of the receiver’s infosets. We denote by σi(I) the action selected at
infoset I ∈ Ii. Letting Σ =×i∈P Σi, we denote by σ ∈ Σ the tuple which specifies the plan chosen
by each receiver. Finally, a mixed strategy xi is a probability distribution over Σi. We let Xi be the
mixed strategy space of receiver i, and X be the set of joint probability distributions over Σ.
The sequence form [24, 32] of a game is a compact representation applicable to games with perfect
recall. It decomposes strategies into sequences of actions and their realization probabilities. A
sequence qi for receiver i associated with a node h is a tuple specifying receiver i’s actions on the
path from the root to h. We denote the set of all sequences for receiver i by Qi. A sequence is
said terminal if, together with some sequences of the other receivers, leads to a terminal node. We
let q∅ be the fictitious sequence leading to the root node and qa the extended sequence obtained
by appending action a to q. A sequence-form strategy (or realization plan) for a receiver i is a
function ri : Qi → [0, 1] such that ri(q∅) = 1 and, for each I ∈ Ii and sequence q leading to I ,
−ri(q) +
∑
a∈A(I) ri(qa) = 0. We denote by Q(I) the set of sequences originating in I . For each
q ∈ Qi, we denote by I↓(q) ⊆ Ii the set of infosets reachable by i after selecting q without making
other intermediate moves, whereas I↑(q) ∈ Ii denotes the unique infoset where the last action of q
was taken. 3 We call two strategies of receiver i realization equivalent if, for any fixed strategy of the
other receivers, they induce the same distribution over Z.
2.2 Ex interim Persuasiveness
Let uS : Σ × Θ → R and ui : Σ × Θ → R be the payoff functions of the sender and receiver
i ∈ R. We assume that the sender is allowed to tailor signals to individual receivers through private
communications. Let Ωi be the set of signals available to receiver i, and let Ω =×i∈R Ωi. We
assume that the sender has access to private information and her goal is designing a signaling scheme
ϕ : Θ → ∆|Ω| to persuade the receivers to select actions which are favorable for her. We denote
by ϕθ the probability distribution over Ω having observed θ. In the classical Bayesian persuasion
framework [20], the receivers decide their behavior after observing the sender’s signal and updating
their posterior over Θ accordingly. The sender-receivers interaction goes as follows:
• The sender chooses ϕ and publicly discloses it.
• Nature draws a state θ ∼ µ0, observed by the sender.
2 int(X) is the interior of set X , and ∆|X| is the set of all probability distributions on X .
3When the context requires disambiguation between different games, we write IΓ↓ (q) to denote the result for
EFG Γ.
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• The sender draws a tuple ω ∼ ϕθ and privately sends signal ωi to each receiver i ∈ R.
• Each receiver i updates her posterior distribution knowing ϕ and having observed ωi. Then,
each of the receivers selects a plan σi ∈ Σi. Together, their joint choices form the tuple
σ = (σ1, . . . , σn).
• Sender and receivers receive, respectively, payoffs uS(θ, σ) and ui(θ, σ), for all i ∈ R.
In this setting, a result similar to the revelation principle (see, e.g., [27]) holds. Specifically, an
optimal signaling scheme (i.e., a signaling scheme maximizing the sender’s expected utility) can
always be obtained by restricting the set of signals Ω to the set of plans Σ (see [20, Proposition 1]).
In the following, we assume Ω = Σ (i.e., the sender recommends a plan to follow to each receiver).
The receivers have an incentive to follow the sender’s recommendation σˆi if the recommended plan
is preferred to any other action, conditional on the knowledge of σˆi. We call this condition ex
interim persuasiveness, which is precisely the kind of constraint characterizing a Bayes correlated
equilibrium (BCE) [6, 7]. We remark that, according to the definition of BCE, the signaling scheme
must necessarily be defined on plans and cannot be compactly represented by using sequences or
actions.
Definition 1 (Ex interim persuasiveness). A signaling scheme ϕ : Θ→ ∆|Σ| is ex interim persuasive
if the following holds for all i ∈ R and σi, σ′i ∈ Σi:∑
θ∈Θ,
σ−i∈Σ−i
µ0(θ)ϕθ(σi, σ−i)
(
ui(θ, (σi, σ−i))− ui(θ, (σ′i, σ−i))
)
≥ 0.
Definition 2. A signaling scheme ϕ : Θ→ ∆|Σ| is a BCE if it is ex interim persuasive.
2.3 Ex ante Persuasiveness
We introduce the setting in which receivers have to decide whether to follow the sender’s recommen-
dations before actually observing them, basing their decision only on the knowledge of µ0 and ϕ. 4
The interaction between sender and receivers goes as follows:
• The sender computes ϕ, and publicly discloses it.
• The receivers decide whether to adhere to the recommendations drawn according to ϕ or not.
• Nature draws a state θ ∼ µ0, observed by the sender.
• If i ∈ R decided to opt-in to the signaling scheme:
◦ the sender draws σˆi ∼ ϕθ and privately communicates it to receiver i;
◦ receiver i acts according to the recommended σˆi.
• Sender and receivers receive, respectively, payoffs uS(θ, σ) and ui(θ, σ), ∀i ∈ R, where
σi = σˆi if i adhered to the scheme.
In this setting, the receivers adhere to the signaling scheme (i.e., σi = σˆi) if it is ex ante persuasive:
Definition 3 (Ex ante persuasiveness). The signaling scheme ϕ : Θ→ ∆|Σ| is ex ante persuasive if,
for all i ∈ R and σi ∈ Σi, the following holds:∑
θ∈Θ,σ′i∈Σi
σ−i∈Σ−i
µ0(θ)ϕθ(σ
′
i, σ−i)
(
ui(θ, (σ
′
i, σ−i))− ui(θ, (σi, σ−i))
)
≥ 0.
Such constraints characterize Bayes coarse correlated equilibria (BCCE), i.e., the generalization of
coarse correlated equilibria to incomplete-information games (see [15, 19, 9]): 5
Definition 4. A signaling scheme ϕ : Θ→ ∆|Σ| is a BCCE if it is ex ante persuasive.
2.4 Comparison
Figure 1 summarizes the interaction flow between sender and receivers in the two settings described
above. The key difference is the time at which the receivers decide whether to adhere to the signaling
scheme or not. We also propose the following illustrative example (in the basic single-receiver setting)
4The receivers’ commitment to follow a certain signaling scheme is not an unrealistic assumption for the
same reason why it is realistic to assume the sender’s commitment power (see Section 1).
5The set of (non Bayesian) coarse correlated equilibria is characterized by the constraints of Definition 3,
with |Θa| = 1 ∀a ∈ A.
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time
S ⇒
R⇒
choose
ϕ
observe
θ ∼ µ0
draw
σˆ ∼ ϕθ uS(θ, σ)
observe
ϕ
observe
σˆi
choose
σi
ui(θ, σ)ex ante
decision
ex interim
decision
In Out P
E (−1, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1/2)
H (−1,−1) (1, 0) (0, 0)
Figure 1: Left: Interaction between sender and receivers in the ex ante and ex interim setting. Right:
A game where ex ante persuasion guarantees the sender a higher expected utility with respect to ex
interim persuasiveness.
to further illustrate the fundamental differences between the two notions of persuasiveness.
Example 1. The incumbent of an industry wants to persuade a potential new entrant to the market.
The market can be either easy (E), with probability 0.3, or hard (H). The incumbent knows the state
of the market. The entrant has three possible actions: entering the market (In), staying out of the
market (Out), or proposing a partnership to the incumbent (P ). Figure 1 depicts the utility matrix
for the game (the first values are incumbent’s payoffs).
The incumbent wants the entrant to stay out of the market, values its entrance negatively, and is
indifferent towards a partnership. The entrant values entering the new market positively only when it
has favorable conditions. A partnership in a hard market gives the entrant 0 (rather than a negative
score) as no fixed costs have to be sustained. In this setting, forcing the entrant (contractually) to
commit to following the incumbent’s recommendations ex ante is strictly better (in terms of expected
utility) for the incumbent.
An optimal ex ante signaling scheme (e.g., ϕE(In) = ϕE(Out) = 12 , ϕH(Out) = 1) guarantees
the sender an expected utility of 0.7. An optimal ex interim signaling scheme (e.g., ϕE(P ) = 1,
ϕH(Out) =
11
14 , ϕH(P ) =
3
14 ,) guarantees a sender’s expected utility of 0.55. Therefore, ex ante
persuasion provides a 27% increase in utility for the incumbent w.r.t. ex interim persuasion.
We remark that the set of ex ante persuasive signaling schemes strictly includes the set of ex interim
signaling schemes. In particular, an optimal ex ante persuasive signaling scheme may lead to an
expected utility for the sender arbitrarily larger than the one she would obtain with an optimal ex
interim scheme. This is shown via the following example:
I1
(k, 0)
t1
(0, 0)
t2
a12
(0, 0)
t1
(0, 0)
t2
a22
(0, 1)
t1
(1, 1)
t2
a32
a11
(0, 0)
a12
(1, 0)
a22
(0,−1)
a32
a21I2
Figure 2: A game with two receivers in which ac-
tion a11 has two possible types t1 and t2. Terminal
nodes report receivers’ utilities.
Example 2. Consider the game in Figure 2,
with two receivers with one information set
each (I1 for receiver 1 and I2 for receiver 2),
and parametric in k  1. Action a11 ∈ A1
is such that Θa11 = {t1, t2} and p˜ia11(t1) =
p˜ia11(t2) = 1/2. The figure only reports the
receivers’ utilities, as we assume uS(θ, σ) =
u1(θ, σ) + u2(θ, σ), ∀(θ, σ). The signaling
scheme with ϕ′t1(a
1
1, a
1
2) = 1/2, ϕ
′
t1(a
2
1, a
2
2) =
1/2, and ϕ′t2(a
1
1, a
3
2) = 1 is ex ante persuasive
but not ex interim persuasive. The optimal ex
interim persuasive signaling scheme is such that
ϕ′′t1(a
2
1, a
2
2) = 1, and ϕ
′′
t2(a
1
1, a
3
2) = 1. Scheme
ϕ′ grants the sender an expected utility of (k + 5)/4, while scheme ϕ′′ guarantees 3/2. Therefore,
for increasing values of k an optimal ex ante signaling scheme provides an arbitrarily larger utility
than what can be obtained by ex interim persuasion.
3 Positive Result
In the independent-actions setting, it is known that computing an optimal ex interim signaling scheme
is #P-hard even with a single receiver [12]. Motivated by this negative result, we study the problem of
computing an optimal (for the sender) ex ante persuasive signaling scheme. We denote this problem
by OPT-EA. It amounts to computing a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) for the game of complete
information obtained by treating Nature as a player with a trivial (i.e., constant everywhere) payoff
function and subject to having marginal strategies constrained to be equal to µ0.
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In contrast with the known hardness results for the ex interim setting, we show that OPT-EA with
|R| = 2 can be solved in polynomial time (see Theorem 5). To prove our main theorem, we first show
how to build, in polynomial time, small (i.e., with a support of polynomial size) mixed strategies
which are realization-equivalent to a given behavioral strategy. Omitted proofs are presented in
Appendix A.
3.1 Small Supported Mixed Strategies
Given a behavioral strategy profile pi∗i for a generic perfect-recall player i, we show (see Theorem 4)
that it is always possible to compute in polynomial time some x∗i ∈ Xi such that (i) it is realization-
equivalent to pi∗i and (ii) it has a support of polynomial size.
6
For each σi ∈ Σi, let ξ(σi) := {q ∈ Qi|∃I ∈ Ii, σi(I) = q} (i.e., the set of sequences selected with
probability 1 in a realization plan equivalent to σi). Analogously, ∀σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ we denote by
ξ(σ) the set of tuples (q1, q2) such that q1 ∈ ξ(σ1) and q2 ∈ ξ(σ2). In the remainder of the section,
we drop the dependency on i when not strictly necessary. We denote by M an |Qi| × |Σi| matrix
where M(q, σ) = 1 iff q ∈ ξ(σ) and M(q, σ) = 0 otherwise. We denote by Mq the row of M
specifying the plans containing q in their support. Let r∗ be the |Qi|-dimensional vector representing
the realization plan of player i which is realization-equivalent to pi∗. In order to compute x∗, it is
enough to find an optimal solution to LP max
x∈R|Σi|≥0
{1>x s.t. Mx ≤ r∗}, which we denote
by A , which has a polynomial number of constraints and an exponential number of variables.
By relying on the assumption of perfect recall and proceeding by contradiction, we establish the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. An optimal solution x∗ to A satisfies Mx∗ = r∗.
We now characterize an optimal solution to A by two properties which are proven by using Lemma 1
and the fact that, as LP A contains a polynomial number of constraints, it admits an optimal basic
solution with only a polynomial number of nonzero variables:
Theorem 2. These two properties hold: (i) An optimal solution x∗ to A is a normal-form strategy
(x∗ ∈ Xi) realization equivalent to r∗, (ii) there exists an optimal solution x∗ with supp(x∗) of
polynomial size.
Let D be the dual of problem A . By showing that an optimal plan corresponding to a violated dual
constraint can be found in polynomial time by backward induction, we establish the following:
Lemma 3. D admits a polynomial-time separation oracle.
Next, by relying on Lemma 3 and on the ellipsoid method we prove a result which is the basis for our
main theorem, Theorem 5 (whose statement and proof are given in full in the next subsection):
Theorem 4. Given an EFG, a perfect-recall player i, and a behavioral strategy profile pi∗ for i (with
the realization-equivalent realization plan r∗), a solution to LP A can be found in polynomial time.
Finally, we show that we can efficiently compute a solution with support size of at most |Qi| by
applying the ellipsoid method for at most a polynomial number of iterations:
Corollary 4.1. A basic feasible solution to A can be computed in polynomial time.
3.2 Optimal Ex Ante Persuasive Schemes
Computing an ex ante persuasive signaling scheme is equivalent to computing a CCE for an EFG of
complete information where Nature is treated as a player with constant utility and marginal strategies
constrained to be equal to µ0. We focus on the setting where |R| = 2 and show that OPT-EA can be
solved in polynomial time. We reason over an auxiliary game such that each action of the receivers is
followed by one of Nature’s nodes, determining its type. Marginal probabilities p˜i determining action
types are treated as behavioral strategies of the Nature player, which we denote by N. Formally:
Definition 5. Given an EFG Γ describing the interaction between receivers and a set of marginal
distributions {p˜ia ∈ int(∆|Θa|)}a∈A, the auxiliary game Γˆ is an EFG such that:
6As customary, we define the support of a mixed strategy xi ∈ Xi as supp(xi) := {σi ∈ Σi|xi(σi) > 0}.
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• It has a set of playersR∪ {N}.
• For each receiver i ∈ R, her utility function is the same as in Γ, i.e., ∀(θ, σ) ∈ Θ × Σ,
ui(θ, σ) = uˆi(θ, σ). Nature has uˆN(·) = k ∈ R constant everywhere.
• The receivers have the same information structures as in Γ, i.e., ∀i ∈ R, Ii = Iˆi, and
∀q ∈ Qi, IΓ↓ (q) = I Γˆ↓ (q).
• ∀i ∈ R, each a ∈ Ai is immediately followed by a singleton infoset I ∈ IN such that
A(I) = Θa.
• ∀I ∈ IN, with I following a ∈ A, N selects actions (types) at I according to the marginal
distribution p˜ia.
The first step is devising an LP to compute a BCCE with a polynomial number of constraints and an
exponential number of variables. We do so by providing an LP to find an optimal CCE over Γˆ. First,
notice that θ is a plan of player N in Γˆ. A distribution in ∆|Θ| is a mixed strategy of N. Denote by µ∗
the mixed strategy realization equivalent to p˜i computed (in poly-time) as in the proof of Theorem 4.
Let Θ∗ := supp(µ∗). Due to Corollary 4.1, the set Θ∗ has polynomial size. Then, we write the
problem as a function of γ ∈ ∆|Σ×Θ∗| (i.e., we look for a correlated distribution in Γˆ, encompassing
the Nature player). Let vi be the |Ii|-dimensional vector of variables of the dual of the best-response
problem for receiver i in sequence form. Moreover, we employ sparse (|R|+1)-dimensional matrices
describing the utility function of sender and receivers for the profiles (θ, q1, q2) leading to terminal
nodes of Γˆ. We denote them by Ui ∈ R|Θ∗|×|Q1|×|Q2|, with i ∈ R ∪ {S}. 7 In the following, we let
q = (q1, q2). The problem of computing a CCE over Γˆ reads:
max
γ≥0,
v1,v2
∑
θ∈Θ∗
σ∈Σ
γ(θ, σ)
∑
q∈ξ(σ)
US(θ, q) (1)
s.t.
∑
θ∈Θ∗
σ∈Σ
γ(θ, σ)
∑
q∈ξ(σ)
Ui(θ, q) ≥
∑
I′∈Ii:
I′∈I↓(q∅)
vi(I
′
) ∀i ∈ R (2)
v1(I↑(q1))−
∑
I′∈I↓(q1)
v1(I
′
)−
∑
θ∈Θ∗
σ∈Σ
γ(θ, σ)
∑
q2∈ξ(σ2)
U1(θ, q1, q2) ≥ 0 ∀q1 ∈ Q1 (3)
v2(I↑(q2))−
∑
I′∈I↓(q2)
v2(I
′
)−
∑
θ∈Θ∗
σ∈Σ
γ(θ, σ)
∑
q1∈ξ(σ1)
U2(θ, q1, q2) ≥ 0 ∀q2 ∈ Q2 (4)
∑
σ∈Σ
γ(θ, σ) = µ
∗
(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ∗. (5)
Algorithm 1 Separation plan search for (θ, z)
1: function F(I ,Q∗) . I ∈ I2 is the current infoset
2: Qˆ← ∅, w(q2)← −∞ ∀q2 ∈ Q2
3: if I ∈ Iz2 then
4: Qˆ← {q2 ∈ Q2|q2 ∈ Q(I) and q2 ∈ Qz2}
5: else
6: Qˆ← Q(I)
7: for q2 ∈ Qˆ do
8: w(q2)←
∑
q1∈Q1
U1(θ, q1, q2)β¯1(q1) +
∑
I′∈I↓(q2)
F(I′, Q∗)
9: q∗2 = arg maxq2∈Q2 w(q2)
10: Q∗ ← Q∗ ∪ {q∗2}
11: return w(q∗2 )
We make the following observations on
the above LP, which we denote by B :
• The left term of constr. (2) is the ex-
pected utility of i at the equilibrium.
Incentive constraints (3) and (4) are
compactly encoded by exploiting the
sequence form. Intuitively, we de-
compose the best-response problem
locally at each infoset. The con-
straints impose that the utility at the
equilibrium be no smaller than the
value achieved when playing the plan
obtained by letting the receiver best
respond at each infoset.
• Constraint (5) forces Nature’s marginal distribution to equal the prior µ∗.
• Once a solution γ∗ to B has been computed, an optimal solution to OPT-EA is the signaling
scheme which, having observed θ, recommends σ with probability γ∗(θ, σ)/µ∗(θ).
The following key positive result holds:
Theorem 5. OPT-EA can be solved in polynomial time when |R| ≤ 2.
7Ui employs both the sequence form (for receivers), and plans of N. However, polynomiality of Θ∗ implies
polynomiality of Ui.
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Proof. Let DB be the dual of B . Let α1, α2 be the dual variables of constraints (2), β1 ∈ R|Q1|
and β2 ∈ R|Q2| the dual variables of (3) and (4), and δ ∈ R|Θ∗| the dual variables of (5). We show
that, given (α¯1, α¯2, β¯1, β¯2, δ¯), the problem of finding either a hyperplane separating the solution from
the feasible set of DB or proving that no such hyperplane exists can be solved in polynomial time.
Along the lines of Theorem 4, this implies that B is solvable in polynomial time by the ellipsoid
method. As the number of dual constraints corresponding to variables vi is linear, all these constraints
can be checked efficiently for violation. Besides those, the dual problem DB features the following
constraint for each (θ, σ) ∈ Θ∗ × Σ:
∑
i∈R
∑
q∈ξ(σ)
Ui(θ, q)α¯i +
δ¯(θ)
µ∗(θ)
−
∑
q∈ξ(σ)
US(θ, q)−
∑
q∈Q1×ξ(σ2)
U1(θ, q)β¯1(q1)−
∑
q∈ξ(σ1)×Q2
U2(θ, q)β¯2(q2) ≥ 0.
Given (α¯1, α¯2, β¯1, β¯2, δ¯), the separation problem of finding a maximally violated inequality of DB
reads:
min
θ,σ
 ∑
q∈ξ(σ)
∑
i∈R
Ui(θ, q)− US(θ, q)
+ δ¯(θ)
µ∗(θ)
−
∑
q∈Q1×ξ(σ2)
U1(θ, q)β¯1(q1) −
∑
q∈ξ(σ1)×Q2
U2(θ, q)β¯2(q2)
 .
A pair (θ, σ) yielding a violated inequality exists iff the separation problem admits an optimal
solution of value < 0. If such a (θ, σ) exists, it can be determined in polynomial time by enu-
merating over the (polynomially many) (θ, z) ∈ Θ∗ × Zˆ, where Zˆ is the outcomes set of Γˆ. For
each pair (θ, z), we look for a σ ∈ Σ which, together with some actions of N, minimizes the ob-
jective function of the separation problem and could lead to z. The procedure halts as soon as a
plan σ such that (θ, σ) yielding a violated inequality is found; if it terminates without finding any,
DB has been solved. First, by fixing a pair (θ, z) the first two terms of the objective function are
completely determined. The remaining terms can be minimized independently for each receiver.
Let us consider the problem of finding σ2 ∈ Σ2 (the other one is solved analogously). It reads
maxσ2∈Σ2{
∑
q1∈Q1
∑
q2∈ξ(σ2) U1(θ, q1, q2)β¯1(q1)}, subject to the constraint that σ2 is an admissi-
ble plan for the given z (i.e., given the solution plan, it has to be possible to reach z together with
some actions of the other players). This problem can be solved in poly-time as shown in Algorithm 1,
where Izi and Qzi are, respectively, the set of infosets and sequences of i encountered on the path
from the root to z. Once Q∗ has been determined by visiting each I ∈ I2, the corresponding optimal
σ2 can be built directly. As in Corollary 4.1, an optimal solution to B has polynomial support size.
Then, it is used to determine an optimal solution to OPT-EA in poly-time.
4 Negative Result
We conclude by showing that the approach of Section 3.2 cannot be extended to settings where
|R| > 2 and that, in particular, the border between easy and hard cases coincides with |R| = 2.
Indeed, the fact that computing an optimal CCE for a three-player EFG is NP-hard [33, Th. 1.3]
directly implies the following:
Theorem 6. OPT-EA is NP-hard when |R| > 2.
In terms of DB , as a consequence of the equivalence between optimization and separation [17] the
previous results maps in the following:
Theorem 7. Computing an optimal solution to DB is NP-hard when |R| > 2.
5 Discussion
We have studied persuasion in the multi-receiver setting with private signals, introducing, for the first
time, a model encompassing receivers with sequential interactions, as well as the notion of ex ante
persuasiveness. In contrast with previous complexity results on computing optimal CCEs and optimal
ex interim persuasive schemes, we have shown that with |R| ≤ 2 an optimal ex ante scheme can be
computed in polynomial time with the ellipsoid method by relying on a polynomial-time separation
oracle. We have also shown that |R| = 2 constitutes the border between easy and hard cases as, even
for |R| = 3, the problem is NP-hard.
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A Omitted Proofs
Lemma 1. An optimal solution x∗ to A satisfies Mx∗ = r∗.
Proof. Consider a behavioral strategy pi∗ whose realization-equivalent realization plan is denoted
by r∗. Since player i has perfect recall, there always exists at least a mixed strategy xˆ ∈ Xi
realization equivalent to pi∗ [26, Th. 6.11]. Therefore, the optimal value of A is 1 (since 1>xˆ = 1).
Given xˆ ∈ Xi, a distribution assigning to each sequence q ∈ Qi value
∑
σ∈Σi:q∈ξ(σ) xˆσ is a valid
realization plan. Therefore, if x ∈ ∆|Σi|, then Mx is a well defined realization plan for i. Now, by
contradiction, assume that x∗ is an optimal solution of A and that there exists q′ ∈ Qi such that
Mq′x
∗ < r∗(q′). Optimality implies 1>x∗ = 1 and, therefore, x∗ ∈ ∆|Σi|. Let Mx∗ = r. We have
r(q′) < r∗(q′). Since the sequence-form constraints hold, there must exist at least one q′′ ∈ Qi such
that r(q′′) > r∗(q′′). This leads to a contradiction since x∗ would not be a feasible solution.
Theorem 2. These two properties hold: (i) An optimal solution x∗ to A is a normal-form strategy
(x∗ ∈ Xi) realization equivalent to r∗, (ii) there exists an optimal solution x∗ with supp(x∗) of
polynomial size.
Proof. Since Mx∗ = r∗ (Lemma 1), we have Mq∅x
∗ = r∗(q∅), that is 1>x∗ = 1. Therefore,
x∗ ∈ Xi. Realization equivalence follows from Lemma 1 and from the fact that Mx∗ defines a valid
realization plan. Moreover, LP A admits a basic optimal solution with at most |Qi| variables with
strictly positive values [30]. Then, there exists an optimal x∗ with support of polynomial size.
Lemma 3. D admits a polynomial-time separation oracle.
Proof. Let α ∈ R|Qi| be the vector of dual variables (corresponding to constraints Mx ≤ r∗). D is
an LP with a polynomial number of variables (|Qi|) and an exponential number of constraints (|Σi|).
We show that, given α¯ ∈ R|Qi|, the problem of finding a hyperplane separating α¯ from the set of
feasible solutions to D or proving that no such hyperplane exists can be solved in polynomial time.
The problem amounts to determining whether there exists a violated (dual) constraint M>σ α¯ ≥ 1 for
some σ ∈ Σi. Given α¯, the separation problem of finding one such constraint of maximum violation
reads: minσ∈Σi{M>σ α¯}. A plan σ yielding a violated constraint exists iff the separation problem
admits an optimal solution of value < 1. One such plan (if any) can be found in polynomial time
by reasoning in a backward induction fashion, starting from information sets of i originating only
terminal sequences, and proceeding backwards. At each I ∈ Ii, player i selects qˆ ∈ Q(I) such
that qˆ ∈ arg minq∈Q(I){
∑
I′∈I↓(q) wI′ + α¯(q)}, and subsequently sets wI :=
∑
I′∈I↓(qˆ) wI′ + α¯(qˆ).
This procedure requires a computing time linear in |Ii|. Then, a maximally violated inequality can be
found by building a plan according to the sequences determined at the previous step.
Theorem 4. Given an EFG, a perfect-recall player i, and a behavioral strategy profile pi∗ for i (with
the realization-equivalent realization plan r∗), a solution to LP A can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. Due to the equivalence between optimization and separation [17], since the separation problem
for D can be solved in polynomial time one can solve D in polynomial time via the ellipsoid
method [23]. As the ellipsoid method solves a primal-dual system encompassing both D and A , it
also produces a solution to A .
Corollary 4.1. A basic feasible solution to A can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. First, the ellipsoid method returns an optimal solution x∗ with polynomial support size (say
|supp(x∗)| = m). This is because the number of iterations is polynomial and, by adding a new
inequality to the dual per iteration, we also add a new variable to the primal per each iteration. If
x∗ is a basic feasible solution, its support is necessarily the smallest possible and we can halt the
procedure. If not, x∗ belongs to the relative interior of a face of the polytope defined by A . Suppose
to have {ejx}mj=1 = supp(x), where ej is the canonical vector with a single 1 in position j. To obtain
an optimal basic-feasible solution, we proceed as follows. Let j := 1. First, we restrict A to the
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optimal face by adding the constraint 1>x = 1>x∗. Then, we reoptimize the LP maximizing the
objective function ejx. If we do not obtain a basic-feasible solution, we iterate the procedure adding
the constraint ejx = ejx∗ and letting j := j + 1. The dimension of the LP is reduced by 1 at each
iteration (and the number of steps is polynomial, as we have one for each of the polynomially-many
variables in supp(x∗)). This leads to optimizing over faces of A of increasingly smaller dimension.
When the dimension reaches 1, the corresponding solution is necessarily a basic one.
Theorem 6. OPT-EA is NP-hard when |R| > 2.
Proof. Let |R| = 3 and, ∀a ∈ A, |Θa| = 1. Then, the problem amounts to computing an optimal
CCE for a three player EFG, which is NP-hard since the reduction of [33, Th. 1.3] directly applies.
Theorem 7. Computing an optimal solution to DB is NP-hard when |R| > 2.
Proof. Consider the case in which R = 3, and DB is adapted accordingly. Let q = (q1, q2, q3).
Given dual variables (α¯1, α¯2, α¯3, β¯1, β¯2, β¯3, δ¯), the separation problem reads:
min
θ,σ
 ∑
q∈ξ(σ)
∑
i∈R
Ui(θ, q)− US(θ, q)
+ δ¯(θ)
µ∗(θ)
−
∑
q∈Q1×ξ(σ2)×ξ(σ3)
U1(θ, q)β¯1(q1)−
∑
q∈ξ(σ1)×Q2×ξ(σ3)
U2(θ, q)β¯2(q2)−
∑
q∈ξ(σ1)×ξ(σ2)×Q3
U3(θ, q)β¯3(q3)
 .
Consider a setting with the following features: ∀θ ∈ Θ∗, δ¯(θ) = 0 (a valid assumption since
δ ∈ R|Θ∗|); ∀(θ, q) ∈ Θ∗ ×
(×i∈RQi), US(θ, q) = U1(θ, q); ∀(θ, q) ∈ Θ∗ × (×i∈RQi),
U2(θ, q) = U3(θ, q) = 0. Then, finding a maximally violated inequality corresponds to solv-
ing: arg maxθ,σ2,σ3{
∑
q∈Q1×ξ(σ2)×ξ(σ3) U1(θ, q)β¯1(q1)}. Let U ′1 ∈ R|Θ
∗|×|Q2|×|Q3| be such that,
for each (θ, q2, q3), U ′1(θ, q2, q3) =
∑
q1∈Q1 U1(θ, q1, q2, q3)β¯(q1). If Θ
∗ is a singleton, the prob-
lem becomes arg maxσ2,σ3{
∑
(q2,q3)∈ξ(σ2)×ξ(σ3) U
′
1(q1, q2)}. This is a joint best-response problem
between receivers 2 and 3, which is known to be NP-hard [33]. Therefore, the separation problem
for constraints corresponding to primal variables γ is NP-hard. Due to the equivalence between
optimization and separation [17], it follows that it is NP-hard to solve DB .
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